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Detecting Byzantine Attacks Without Clean
Reference
Ruohan Cao, Tan F. Wong, Tiejun Lv, Hui Gao and Shaoshi Yang
Abstract—We consider an amplify-and-forward relay network
composed of a source, two relays, and a destination. In this
network, the two relays are untrusted in the sense that they may
perform Byzantine attacks by forwarding altered symbols to the
destination. Note that every symbol received by the destination
may be altered, and hence no clean reference observation is
available to the destination. For this network, we identify a
large family of Byzantine attacks that can be detected in the
physical layer. We further investigate how the channel conditions
impact the detection against this family of attacks. In particular,
we prove that all Byzantine attacks in this family can be
detected with asymptotically small miss detection and false alarm
probabilities by using a sufficiently large number of channel ob-
servations if and only if the network satisfies a non-manipulability
condition. No pre-shared secret or secret transmission is needed
for the detection of these attacks, demonstrating the value of
this physical-layer security technique for counteracting Byzantine
attacks.
I. INTRODUCTION
In many communication networks, no direct physical link
exists between source and destination nodes. As a result,
the information that is to be delivered from a source to a
destination has to be relayed by intermediate relay nodes.
This gives the potentially malicious relay nodes the chances to
perform Byzantine attacks by altering the information intended
for the destination. Such attacks degrade the security of the
network, and may diminish the potential benefits of relaying
in practice [1], [2].
Under the risk of Byzantine attacks, one major challenge in
achieving secure communications is to determine the existence
of malicious relays. Conventionally, cryptographic keys or
Manuscript received February 1, 2016; revised June 21, 2016; Accepted
July 8, 2016. The associate editor coordinating the review of the manuscript
and approving it for publication was Prof. Lifeng Lai.
The financial support of the National Natural Science Foundation of China
(NSFC) (Grant No. 61271188, 61401041 and 61501046), of the Project
funded by China Postdoctoral Science Foundation, and of the National Science
Foundation (NSF) under Grant CCF-1320086 is gratefully acknowledged.
Copyright (c) 2016 IEEE. Personal use of this material is permitted.
However, permission to use this material for any other purposes must be
obtained from the IEEE by sending a request to pubs-permissions@ieee.org.
R. Cao is with the Institute of Information Photonics and Optical Com-
munications, Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications (BUPT),
Beijing 100876, China (e-mail: caoruohan@bupt.edu.cn). She is also with the
School of Information and Communication Engineering, BUPT.
T. F. Wong is with the Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering,
University of Florida, FL 32611, U.S. (e-mail: twong@ufl.edu).
T. Lv and H. Gao are with the School of Information and Com-
munication Engineering, BUPT, Beijing 100876, China (e-mail: {lvtiejun,
huigao}@bupt.edu.cn).
S. Yang is with the School of Electronics and Computer Sci-
ence, University of Southampton, SO17 1BJ Southampton, U.K. (e-mail:
sy7g09@ecs.soton.ac.uk).
tracing symbols are often added to the information in or above
the physical layer for making Byzantine attacks detectable.
More specifically, in [3], [4], cryptographic keys are applied
at the source to encrypt the data above the physical layer.
Relying on the a priori shared knowledge of cryptographic
keys, the destination performs attack detection by checking
whether or not its received data obeys the constraints imposed
by the cryptographic keys. In [5]-[8], tracing symbols are
inserted into the transmitted signal in the physical layer. Using
these tracing symbols, the intended destination is capable
of determining whether an attack has occurred or not by
comparing the known and observed tracing symbols. These
cryptography-based and tracing-symbol-based schemes require
the cryptographic information and tracing symbols, to which
the relays are not privy, to be shared between the source and
destination before the communication takes place.
It is also possible to detect Byzantine attacks without
assuming any prior shared secret in certain network scenarios,
where a “clean” reference is available for attack detection. For
instance, in [9]–[11], special symbols are carefully generated
and inserted into network-coded packets. By comparing the
network-coded packets received from different relays, the
destination can infer whether the relay network is malicious
or not. However, the detection methods employed by [9]–[11]
require at least one guaranteed “safe packet” be delivered
to the destination so that this safe packet can serve as a
clean reference to enable attack detection. This requirement
is often satisfied by assuming that at least one relay or link
is absolutely trustworthy. This assumption can be eliminated
in a two-way relay (TWR) or one-way relay network by the
schemes in [12]–[16]. Benefiting from the network topology
of a TWR network, each source (destination) node can utilize
its own transmitted symbols as the clean reference to carry out
attack detection [12]–[15]. To further elaborate, in [12], each
node’s own lattice-coded transmitted symbols are employed
to simultaneously support secret transmission and construct
an algebraic manipulation detection (AMD) code to detect
Byzantine attacks in TWR networks with Gaussian channels.
However, it is difficult to extend this scheme to non-Gaussian
channels. In our previous work [13]–[15], we show that for
TWR networks with discrete memoryless channels (DMCs),
it is possible to detect potential Byzantine attacks without
any AMD code or cryptographic keys. The basic idea is that
each node utilizes its own transmitted symbols as a clean
reference for statistically checking against the other node’s
symbols forwarded by the relay. In [16], a two-hop, one-way
relay network is considered. It is assumed that a safe direct
link from the source to the destination exists. Since the direct
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link is not attacked, observations made through the direct link
can be utilized as the clean reference to check against attacks
imposed by the possibly malicious relay.
In many relay networks, the clean reference assumed in
[12]–[16] does not exist. Schemes have been proposed in
[17]–[19] to detect Byzantine attacks without using any prior
shared secret in some relay networks where no clean reference
is available to the destination. These schemes assume that
each malicious relay garbles its received symbols according
to independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) stochastic
distributions. This model of i.i.d. attacks may not always
be valid in practice, although it makes analysis simple. The
Byzantine attack detection methods presented in [17]–[19]
may no longer be provably unbreakable for non-i.i.d. attacks.
Against this background, we consider in this paper the
Byzantine attack detection problem in a one-way, two-hop
network consisting of a source node, two potentially malicious
relay nodes and a destination node, where clean reference
is unavailable. There are two independent transmission paths
from the source node to the destination node, each via a relay
node that may perform Byzantine attacks. For this network,
we propose an attack detection approach employing only
the physical-layer signals that the destination receives. No
AMD codes or cryptographic keys are needed. Our treatment
is considerably different from existing contributions [17]–
[19] in that a more generalized attack model is considered.
In particular, this model allows the two relays to conduct
non-i.i.d. attacks. It is worth noting that considering non-
i.i.d. attacks significantly complicates the analysis presented
in this paper. Moreover, since all symbols observed by the
destination node are prone to Byzantine attacks, no clean
reference is available at the destination. Under these more
general assumptions, the major contributions of this paper are
summarized as follows:
1) We identify a large family of Byzantine attacks that
physically correspond to the case in which the two relays
do not collude in attack. For a Byzantine attack in this
family, the attack can be sufficiently characterized by
two stochastic matrices, each containing the empirical
transition probabilities between a relay’s input symbols
and output symbols. This result is summarized in Propo-
sition 1 of Section III.
2) We prove that under a non-manipulable channel condi-
tion, all Byzantine attacks in the aforementioned fam-
ily are asymptotically detectable by simply comparing
proper statistics generated from the destination’s obser-
vations to known values of the statistics when there is
no attack. This result is summarized in Theorem 1 of
Section III.
3) Additionally, we also find a non-i.i.d. attack strategy, not
belonging to the aforementioned family of Byzantine at-
tacks, which is always capable of fooling the destination
in this network with no clean reference. This result is
summarized in Proposition 2 of Section III.
In short, we investigate in this paper both the feasibility and
vulnerability of detecting Byzantine attacks in the physical
layer of networks without clean references. The rest of this
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Fig. 1: A relay network with two unsafe links from the source
to the destination.
paper is organized follows. In Section II, the problem to be
addressed is formalized. In Section III, we provide our main
results as described above. In Section IV, we discuss how to
check for the above-mentioned non-manipulability condition
numerically. Numerical simulation results are given in Sec-
tion V, and finally the conclusions are drawn in Section VI. In
Appendices A and B, we detail the proofs of the propositions
and Theorem 1, respectively.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
A. Notation
Let a be an m×1 column vector and A be an m×n matrix.
For i = 1, 2, . . . ,m and j = 1, 2, . . . , n, [a]i denotes the
ith element of a, and [A]i,j denotes the (i, j)th entry of A.
Whenever there is no ambiguity, we will employ the notation
with no brackets for simplicity. The transpose of A is denoted
by AT . The Euclidean norm of a is ‖a‖2, and ‖A‖2 is the
Frobenius norm of A. |a| and |A| denote the L1-norm of a
and A, respectively. The Kronecker product of matrices A and
B is represented by A⊗B. The identity and zero matrices of
any dimension are denoted by the generic symbols I and 0,
respectively.
For the random variables, we use upper-case script let-
ters and serif-font letters to denote the corresponding dis-
crete alphabets and elements in the alphabets, respectively.
For instance, suppose that we denote a finite alphabet by
X = {x1, x2, . . . , x|X |}, where |X | is the cardinality of X .
Then X is a generic random variable over X , and x is a
generic element in X . For a pair of random variables X
and Y , we use PX(x) and PX|Y (x|y) to denote the marginal
distribution of X and the conditional distribution of X given
Y , respectively. Whenever needed, we will treat PX|Y as a
stochastic matrix whose entries are specified by PX|Y (x|y)
with x and y indexing the rows and columns, respectively.
Similarly, PX is also treated as an 1×|X | vector whose entries
are specified by PX(x) with x indexing the columns.
We employ xn to denote a sequence of n symbols drawn
from X , and xi to denote the ith symbol in xn. We also employ
Xn to denote a sequence of n random variables defined over
X , and Xi to denote the ith random variable in Xn. The
counting function N(x|xn) records the number of occurrences
of the element x in the sequence xn. The indicator function
1i(x|xn) tells whether xi is x. We may also use 1i(x) instead
of 1i(x|xn) for simplicity, whenever the meaning is clear
from the context. It is clear that N(x|xn) = ∑ni=1 1i(x|xn).
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We may trivially extend the aforementioned notations to a
tuple of symbols drawn from the corresponding alphabets.
The empirical distribution of the sequence xn is denoted
by Πxn(x) , 1nN(x|xn), while the empirical conditional
distribution of xn given yn is Πxn|yn(x|y) , N(x,y|x
n,yn)
N(y|yn) ,
provided that N(y|yn) > 0. Similar to the notation of PX|Y
and PX|Y (x|y), we also treat Πxn|yn as a stochastic matrix,
whose entries are specified by Πxn|yn(x|y) with x and y
indexing the rows and columns, respectively. Moreover, since
Xn and Y n denote random sequences, if the subscript of
Πxn|yn is written in uppercase as ΠXn|Y n , then ΠXn|Y n
will be viewed as a random matrix denoting the empirical
conditional distribution of Xn given Y n.
Throughout this paper, Greek letters are exclusively used to
represent constants and functions that have arbitrarily small
yet positive value. In particular, ε (σ) → 0 as σ → 0.
Unless otherwise stated, any convergence involving random
variables should be interpreted as convergence in probability.
For example, if {Xn} and {Y n} are two sequences of random
variables (matrices) over the same alphabet, Xn → Y n means
|Xn − Y n| → 0 (or ‖Xn − Y n‖2 → 0) in probability as n
approaches infinity. For easy reference, the main quantities
defined and employed in the rest of the paper are listed in
Table I.
B. Channel Model
Consider the relay network shown in Fig. 1. The source
sends symbols to the destination through two distinct paths.
Along each path, the source symbols are forwarded by a
potentially malicious relay to the destination. A malicious
relay may forward symbols that are different from the ones
received from the source. Our goal is to detect malicious
actions of the two relays by observing the received symbols.
The channels from the source to the relays, and from the relays
to the destination are assumed to be memoryless with discrete
inputs and outputs.
Let X be a discrete random variable, with probability
mass function (PMF) PX , that specifies a generic symbol
transmitted by the source. During the period spanning the
time instants 1, 2, . . . , n, the source transmits Xn. We assume
Xn is an i.i.d. sequence whose symbols are all independently
drawn from X according to PX . For description convenience,
the two relays are referred to as “relay 1” and “relay 2”.
Correspondingly, their generic received symbols are denoted
by U1 and U2. Hence, the channel from the source to the relays
is characterized by the conditional PMF PU1,U2|X . We also
write the joint PMF of (U1, U2) in the form of the 1×|U1||U2|
vector PU1,U2 , whose elements are defined as:
[PU1,U2 ]j , PU1,U2 (u1,k, u2,t) (1)
for j = (k − 1) |U2| + t, where k = 1, 2, . . . , |U1| and t =
1, 2, . . . , |U2|.
After the relays receive symbols from the source during
time instants 1, 2, . . . , n, the relays simultaneously forward
the symbols, possibly manipulated, to the destination during
the period covering the time instants n + 1, n + 2, . . . , 2n.
More precisely, relay 1 sends the sequence V n1 while relay
2 sends the sequence V n2 . We may assume with no loss of
generality that V1 = U1 and V2 = U2. Let us use Y to
denote the generic symbol observed by the destination. The
multiple-access channel from the two relays to the destination
is characterized by the conditional PMF PY |V1V2 . Like before,
we may interpret PY |V1,V2 as a |Y|×|U1||U2| matrix, whose
entries are defined as:[
PY |V1,V2
]
i,j
, PY |V1,V2 (yi |v1,k, v2,t ) , (2)
for j = (k − 1) |U2| + t, where k = 1, 2, . . . , |U1| and
t = 1, 2, . . . , |U2|. The PMF pair (PU1,U2 , PY |V1,V2 ) will
be referred to as observation channel. The knowledge of
(PU1,U2 , PY |V1,V2 ) is assumed to be available to the desti-
nation for facilitating maliciousness detection.
During the period spanning the time instants n + 1, n +
2, . . . , 2n, the destination observes the sequence Y n. The
destination needs to determine whether the relays have ma-
nipulated their received sequences or not by processing and
analyzing Y n. In particular, we will employ the empirical
distribution ΠY n of Y n to construct decision statistics for
detecting potential malicious manipulations by the relays. Note
that we may again write ΠY n as a 1× |Y| vector, whose jth
element is defined as
[ΠY n ]j ,
N(yj |Y n )
n
, (3)
for j = 1, 2, . . . |Y|.
C. Malicious Relays
For m = 1, 2, let Unm denote the sequence of n symbols
observed by the mth relay during time instants 1, 2, . . . , n, and
V nm denote the sequence of n symbols transmitted by the relay
during time instants n+ 1, n+ 2, . . . , 2n. Then the actions of
the relays are specified by the mapping from (Un1 , U
n
2 , X
n) to
(V n1 , V
n
2 ). We allow this mapping to be stochastic in general,
described by the conditional PMF PV n1 ,V n2 |Un1 ,Un2 ,Xn , as long
as it satisfies the following Markovity constraints:
PV n1 |Un1 ,Un2 ,Xn(v
n
1 |un1 , un2 , xn) = PV n1 |Un1 (vn1 |un1 )
PV n2 |Un1 ,Un2 ,Xn(v
n
2 |un1 , un2 , xn) = PV n2 |Un2 (vn2 |un2 ). (4)
Physically these constraints impose the restriction that each
relay can only formulate its attack (modification from Unm to
V nm) based solely on the symbol sequence that it has received
from the source.
We note that the knowledge of (PV n1 |Un1 , PV n2 |Un2 ) is usually
not available to the destination for attack detection. Thus we
seek alternative non-parametric characterizations of the relay
actions that do not require such knowledge. In particular,
we will employ the empirical conditional PMFs (conditional
types) ΠV n1 ,V n2 |Un1 ,Un2 , ΠV n1 |Un1 and ΠV n2 |Un2 to characterize
the actions of relays 1 and 2. As before, for m = 1, 2, the
conditional type ΠV nm|Unm may be treated as a |Um|× |Um|
matrix whose (i, j)th entry is defined by
[ΠV nm|Unm ]i,j ,
N (vm,i, um,j |V nm, Unm)
N (um,j |Unm)
. (5)
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TABLE I: Notation Table
X Source symbol
Um Symbol received by relay m (m = 1, 2)
Vm Symbol forwarded by relay m (m = 1, 2)
Y Symbol observed by the destination
X , Um, Vm, Y Alphabets of X , Um, Vm and Y , respectively
PU1,U2|X Conditional PMF of (U1, U2) given X
PU1,U2 Joint PMF of (U1, U2)
PY |V1,V2 Conditional PMF of Y given (V1, V2)(
PU1,U2 , PY |V1,V2
)
Observation channel
Unm Symbol sequence received by relay m (m = 1, 2)
V nm Symbol sequence forwarded by relay m (m = 1, 2)
Y n Symbol sequence observed by the destination
Um,i, Vm,i The ith symbols in Unm and V
n
m, respectively
um, vm Generic elements in Um and Vm, respectively
1i (um |Unm ) Indicator of whether Um,i = um
1i
(
u1, u2
∣∣Un1 , Un2 ) Indicator of whether U1,i = u1 and U2,i = u2
1i (um, vm |Unm, V nm ) Indicator of whether Um,i = um and Vm,i = vm
N (um |Unm )
∑n
i 1i (um |Unm )
N
(
u1, u2
∣∣Un1 , Un2 ) ∑ni 1i (u1, u1 ∣∣Un1 , Un2 )
N (um, vm |Unm, V nm )
∑n
i 1i (um, vm |Unm, V nm )
ΠV n1 |Un1 (v1 |u1 )
N(u1,v1|Un1 ,V n1 )
N(u1|Un1 )
ΠV n2 |Un2 (v2 |u2 )
N(u2,v2|Un2 ,V n2 )
N(u2|Un2 )
ΠV n1 ,V
n
2 |Un1 ,Un2 (v1, v2 |u1, u2 )
N(u1,u2,v1,v2|Un1 ,Un2 ,V n1 ,V n2 )
N(u1,u2|Un1 ,Un2 )
xi, um,i, vm,i, yi The ith elements in alphabets X , Um, Vm, and Y , respectively[
ΠV nm|Unm
]
i,j
ΠV nm|Unm (vm,i |um,j )[
ΠV n1 ,V
n
2 |Un1 ,Un2
]
i,j
ΠV n1 ,V n2 |Un1 ,Un2 (v1,t1 , v2,t2 |u1,k1 , u2,k2 ), j = (k1 − 1) |U2|+ k2, i = (t1 − 1) |U2|+ t2
[PU1,U2 ]j Pr{U1 = u1,k, U2 = u2,t}, j = (k − 1) |U2|+ t[
PY |V1,V2
]
i,j
Pr{Y = yi |V1 = v1,k, V2 = v2,t}, j = (k − 1) |U2|+ t
D (Y n) Decision statistic as a function of Y n
I Identity matrix with any dimension
⊗ Kronecker operator
Similarly, we also treat ΠV n1 ,V n2 |Un1 ,Un2 as a |U1||U2|×|U1||U2|
matrix whose (i, j)th entry is defined by[
ΠV n1 ,V n2 |Un1 ,Un2
]
i,j
=
N (u1,k1 , u2,k2 , v1,t1 , v2,t2 |Un1 , Un2 , V n1 , V n2 )
N (u1,k1 , u2,k2 |Un1 , Un2 )
, (6)
for i = (t1 − 1) |U2| + t2 and j = (k1 − 1) |U2| + k2, where
k1, t1 = 1, 2 . . . , |U1| and k2, t2 = 1, 2 . . . , |U2|. We will
restrict ourselves to consider the family of relay actions that
satisfy the following constraint:
ΠV n1 ,V n2 |Un1 ,Un2 (v1,v2|u1,u2)→ΠV n1 |Un1 (v1|u1)ΠV n2 |Un2 (v2|u2) , (7)
for all (u1, v1) ∈ U21 and (u2, v2) ∈ U22 . This constraint can
be interpreted as the relays cannot decide their own actions
by colluding with each other, either beforehand or during the
transmission process.
We will see from Theorem 1 of Section III that for the
purpose of attack detection, the conditional types ΠV n1 |Un1 and
ΠV n2 |Un2 are sufficient for characterizing the maliciousness of
any non-colluding relay actions that satisfy (7). In addition, it
is clear that ΠV n1 |Un1 and ΠV n2 |Un2 describe the maliciousness
of individual actions of relays 1 and 2, respectively. When
ΠV nm|Unm = I (i.e., V
n
m = U
n
m), relay m is intuitively non-
malicious in the sense that it faithfully forwards its received
sequence to the destination. This motivates us to adopt the
following more formal definition of maliciousness of the relays
based on ΠV n1 |Un1 and ΠV n2 |Un2 :
Definition 1. (Non-malicious relay) For m = 1, 2, relay m
is said to be non-malicious if ΠV nm|Unm → I as n approaches
infinity. Otherwise, relay m is considered to be malicious. In
addition, the relay network is considered to be safe if both
relays are non-malicious, i.e., ΠV n1 |Un1 → I and ΠV n2 |Un2 → I .
Note that the above definition of non-maliciousness of re-
lay m is more relaxed than the strict requirement of ΠV nm|Unm =
I , since it allows relay m to alter a negligible portion of its
received symbols. Although we adopt this relaxation for math-
ematical convenience, it has minimal practical implications,
because the negligible altered symbols can be corrected by
using channel coding/decoding in practice.
For the family of relay actions that satisfy (7), we will show
in Lemma 2 that
PU1,U2(Π
T
V n1 |Un1 ⊗Π
T
V n2 |Un2 )P
T
Y |V1,V2 → ΠY n as n→∞.
(8)
Since the destination is capable of calculating ΠY n directly
from its observation Y n, the above convergence allows the
destination to estimate ΠV n1 |Un1 and ΠV n2 |Un2 from Y
n ob-
tained in the physical layer. Then, the attack detection can be
achieved by comparing the estimate of (ΠV n1 |Un1 , ΠV n2 |Un2 )
to (I , I). The particular detection method and its performance
analysis will be detailed in Appendix B. Furthermore, it is
clear from the convergence characterized by (8) that the obser-
vation channel (PU1,U2 , PY |V1,V2) is essential for determining
the detectability of the attacks. We will investigate in more
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depth how (PU1,U2 , PY |V1,V2) affects the detection of such
attacks in Section III.
Note that the restriction imposed by (7) excludes some
possible attacks. Nevertheless, Proposition 1 in Section III
shows that the family of possible attacks that satisfy (7) is in
fact rather large. In particular, it allows one relay to conduct
any deterministic or random attack, provided that the other
relay can only conduct certain stationary attacks, e.g., i.i.d.
attacks. Compared with the existing schemes which restrict
both relays to make i.i.d. attacks, our results in Section III
extend the family of attacks that can be detected at the
destination based only on its observations.
III. MAIN RESULTS
From (8), we see that the observation channel
(PU1,U2 , PY |V1,V2) plays a critical role in determining
whether an attack from the family satisfying (7) can be
detected by the destination solely using its own observation
Y n. Specifically, this detectability is determined by the
number of stochastic matrix pairs (Υ1,Υ2), which are
solutions to the matrix equation:
PU1,U2P
T
Y |V1,V2 = PU1,U2(Υ1 ⊗Υ2)PTY |V1,V2 , (9)
where Υ1 and Υ2 are of dimensions |U1|×|U1| and |U2|×|U2|,
respectively. Recall from Definition 1 that relay m is non-
malicious if ΠV nm|Unm → I for m = 1, 2. Thus, it is intuitive
that if the observation channel (PU1,U2 , PY |V1,V2) constitutes
such a pair of distributions that make (I, I) the unique solution
to (9), then comparing ΠY n with PU1,U2P
T
Y |V1,V2 can tell us
whether malicious attacks have been carried out by the relays.
On the other hand, if (9) has multiple solutions, then there
exist attacks that cannot be detected by simply comparing
ΠY n with PU1,U2P
T
Y |V1,V2 . This intuitive argument leads to
the dichotomy of all observation channels into the following
two classes:
Definition 2. (Non-manipulable observation channel) The
observation channel
(
PU1,U2 , PY |V1,V2
)
is said to be non-
manipulable if (I, I) is the unique stochastic matrix pair that
solves (9). Otherwise, the observation channel is said to be
manipulable.
With this dichotomy of observation channels, we can now
present the main results of this paper, which formally establish
the detectability of malicious attacks from the family that
satisfies (7) at the destination:
Theorem 1. (Maliciousness detectability) For all mali-
cious actions that satisfy (7), the observation channel(
PU1,U2 , PY |V1,V2
)
is non-manipulable constitutes the neces-
sary and sufficient condition for the existence of a decision
statistic D (Y n) which simultaneously has the following two
properties:
For any fixed sufficiently small δ > 0 and  > 0, and for all
sufficiently large n, we have
1) Pr
{
D (Y n) > δ
∣∣∣∑2m=1 ‖ΠV nm|Unm − I‖2 > δ} ≥ 1 −
, whenever Pr
{∑2
m=1 ‖ΠV nm|Unm − I‖2 > δ
}
> 0,
2) Pr
{
D (Y n) > ε(δ)
∣∣∣∑2m=1 ‖ΠV nm|Unm − I‖2 ≤ δ} ≤
, whenever Pr
{∑2
m=1 ‖ΠV nm|Unm − I‖2 ≤ δ
}
> 0,
where ε(δ)→ 0 as δ → 0.
Note that for a non-manipulable observation channel, prop-
erties 1) and 2) of Theorem 1 together imply that D (Y n)→ 0
if and only if the relay network is safe (see Definition 1). This
means that the destination may detect an attack by simply
comparing the decision statistic D(Y n) to the threshold 0.
Then property 1 guarantees a small miss detection probability
when an attack has occurred, while property 2 guarantees
a small false alarm probability when no attack has been
carried out by the relays. On the other hand, no such decision
statistic exists for a manipulable observation channel, and thus
over this type of channels malicious attacks imposed by the
relays cannot be accurately detected based only on Y n at the
destination.
We see that Theorem 1 provides a definite answer to
the detectability of attacks in the family (7). Its usefulness
and contribution depend on whether the family (7) contains
many common attacks beyond i.i.d attacks, whose detectability
has been previously investigated. To this end, the following
proposition shows that (7) does include a very large class of
attacks including many common non-i.i.d. attacks.
Proposition 1. Let (V n1 , V n2 , Un1 , Un2 ) be jointly distributed
according to
PV n1 ,V n2 ,Un1 ,Un2 (v
n
1 , v
n
2 , u
n
1 , u
n
2 ) =
PV n1 |Un1 (v
n
1 |un1 )PV n2 |Un2 (vn2 |un2 )
n∏
i=1
PUn1 ,Un2 (u1,i, u2,i). (10)
Suppose that there exists a constant cv2|u2 satisfying
E {1i(v2|V n2 )|Un2 = un2} = cv2|u2 for all i such that u2,i = u2.
Then, Pr{ΠV n1 |Un1 (v1|u1) > 0} → 1 and PU1,U2(u1, u2) > 0
imply
ΠV n1 ,V n2 |Un1 ,Un2 (v1, v2|u1, u2)→ ΠV n1 |Un1 (v1|u1)ΠV n2 |Un2 (v2|u2).
Note that Proposition 1 only restricts one relay’s (re-
lay 2) malicious action, and the other relay’s (relay 1) at-
tack can be arbitrary without any restriction. The condition
E {1i(v2|V n2 )|Un2 = un2} = cv2|u2 for relay 2 is a first-order
stationarity requirement on the attack mapping from Un2 to
V n2 . It is easy to check that this condition is satisfied by i.i.d.
attacks as well as any attack that can be modeled by a Markov
chain with a unique stationary distribution.
The example illustrated by Fig. 2 describes an attack sce-
nario that can be modeled by a stationary Markov chain, and
hence by Proposition 1 satisfying (7). More specifically, in
Fig. 2 a jammer inserts malicious sequence Jn into the data
flowing to relay 2. We assume that the symbols of Jn, V n2 and
Un2 take values from the same finite field Fq . The ith output
symbol of relay 2 is given by V2,i = (Ji + U2,i)q , where (·)q
is the modulo value of its argument with base q, and q is
a prime number. This assumption approximately models the
case that the symbols of Jn and Un2 superimpose before they
arrive at relay 2, which simply forwards its received symbols
to the destination. We assume that the jammer sequence Jn is
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Fig. 2: A relay network with a jammer, which transmits Jn
obeying a stationary Markov stochastic process.
a stationary Markov sequence satisfying PJi = PJiPJi+1|Ji ,
i = 1, . . . n, where PJi is the distribution of Ji, and PJi+1|Ji
specifies the transfer probability from Ji to Ji+1. In addition,
Jn is also independent of all other random variables. Note
that the action of relay 1 specified by the mapping from Un1
to V n1 is arbitrary. It is easy to check that for all i such
that u2,i = u2, E {1i(v2|V n2 )|Un2 = un2} = PJi
(
(v2 − u2)q
)
.
Therefore, Proposition 1 applies, showing that this attack
scenario is within the family (7). Theorem 1 is thus applicable
to this attack scenario as well.
In summary, Theorem 1 and Proposition 1 together
show that non-manipulability of the observation channel
(PU1,U2 , PY |V1,V2) is necessary and sufficient for the de-
tectability of a very large family of attacks by solely using the
sequence received at the destination. This family of attacks is
specified by (7) and includes attacks in which the action of
one relay can be modeled by a first-order stationary mapping,
while the action of the other relay can be completely arbitrary.
This contribution distinguishes our work from the existing
literature that either focuses on i.i.d. attacks conducted by
both relays, or imposes the requirement of utilizing reliable
observations.
We note that while the family (7) contains a very large class
of attacks that can be detected at the destination by Theorem 1,
Proposition 2 below shows that there are attacks that cannot
be detected based on observing only Y n.
Proposition 2. Let (V n1 , V n2 , Un1 , Un2 ) be distributed accord-
ing to (10). Consider the attack in which the two relays
permutate their received symbols according to the same pre-
determined order. This means that V n1 and V
n
2 are respective
rearrangements of Un1 and U
n
2 , and for any k, t = 1, . . . n,
if V1,k = U1,t and V1,t = U1,k, we must have V2,k = U2,t
and V2,t = U2,k. For this attack, there does not exist any
decision statistic D (Y n) that satisfies the two properties given
in Theorem 1.
Note that the permutation attack described in Proposition 2
does not belong to the family (7). Intuitively, the two relays
collude in agreeing to permute their respective received sym-
bols in the same order. We see that the lack of a clean reference
at the destination prevents it from detecting this kind of attacks
in which the two relays collude.
To summarize, we have briefly discussed some practical
implications of the theoretical detectability results provided
by Theorem 1, Proposition 1 and Proposition 2. These results
show that it is possible to perform Byzantine attack detection
when no clean reference is available at the destination for
a large family of non-colluding attacks. The lack of a clean
reference is rather commonplace in many peer-to-peer or
ad hoc networks, where we may not be able to guarantee
the trustworthiness of all relay nodes. The Byzantine attack
detectability results in Theorem 1 and Proposition 1 suggest
us to form the network in a more judicious manner so that
it is less likely to select relay nodes that may collude in
attack. By doing so, malicious attacks by the relay nodes can
be detected. Moreover, since the proposed Byzantine attack
detection techniques do not require any cryptographic aid,
the usual overheads incurred in the implementation of cryp-
tographic systems, such as key management and distribution,
can be avoided.
IV. CHECKING THE NON-MANIPULABILITY CONDITION
As shown in Theorem 1, the detectability of attacks
in the family (7) is determined by whether the condi-
tion of non-manipulability holds for the observation channel
(PU1,U2 , PY |V1,V2) or not. Recall that (PU1,U2 , PY |V1,V2) is
non-manipulable if (I, I) is the unique stochastic solution
to (9). This condition is sometimes difficult to check. In
this section, we discuss a numerically efficient method to
check the non-manipulability condition. The main idea is
to transform the task of checking the condition of non-
manipulability into an optimization problem that can be solved
by standard methods. To this end, we first rewrite the solution
of (9) as that of an optimization problem (see (11) below).
The non-manipulability condition is equivalent to the solution
to the optimization problem taking an extremal value in the
possible range. This optimization problem is non-convex as its
feasible set is non-convex. In order to find numerically efficient
methods to solve this optimization problem, we further relax
the feasible set to a convex set, which results a convex
optimization problem (see (16) below) that can be solved
efficiently.
More specifically, we first consider the optimization below:
min
Υ1,Υ2
|U1|∑
k=1
[Υ1]k,k +
|U2|∑
k=2
[Υ2]k,k (11a)
s.t. PU1,U2(Υ
T
1 ⊗ΥT2 )PTY |V1,V2 = PU1,U2PTY |V1,V2 , (11b)
0 ≤ [Υ1]i,j ≤ 1, 1 ≤ i ≤ |U1| , 1 ≤ j ≤ |U1| , (11c)
0 ≤ [Υ2]i,j ≤ 1, 1 ≤ i ≤ |U2| , 1 ≤ j ≤ |U2| , (11d)
|U1|∑
i=1
[Υ1]i,j = 1, j = 1, 2, . . . , |U1| , (11e)
|U2|∑
i=1
[Υ2]i,j = 1, j = 1, 2, . . . , |U2| . (11f)
It is clear that the minimum value of the problem (11)
lies inside the interval [0, |U1|+ |U2|]. Moreover, under the
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constraints (11b)–(11f), the value of the objective function
in (11) can be equal to |U1| + |U2| if and only if Υ1 = I
and Υ2 = I . For any other choice of (Υ1,Υ2), the value of
the objective function in (11) is strictly smaller than |U1|+|U2|.
From this observation, we can conclude that (Υ1,Υ2) = (I, I)
is the unique solution to (9), and hence
(
PU1,U2 , PY |V1,V2
)
is
non-manipulable, if and only if the minimum value of the
problem (11) is |U1|+ |U2|. Thus we may determine whether
the observation channel is non-manipulable by solving the
optimization problem (11) and checking whether the minimum
value attained is |U1|+|U2|. Because the constraint (11b) is not
convex, the optimization problem (11) is non-convex. Hence,
it is challenging to solve the problem in a computationally
efficient manner.
To check the non-manipulability condition efficiently, we
relax the feasible set specified by (11b)–(11f) into a convex
set in order to obtain convexity. Note that the non-convexity of
(11) is caused by the Kronecker product appearing in (11b).
In order to get a convex feasible set, we replace Υ1 ⊗ Υ2
with a |U1| |U2| × |U1| |U2| matrix Υ in (11b). Then from the
constraint that Υ1 and Υ2 are stochastic matrices, W must
satisfy the following linear constraints:
|U1||U2|∑
i=1
[Υ]i,j = 1, j = 1, 2, . . . , |U1| |U2| , (12)
|U1|∑
i=1
[Υ1]i,j = 1, j = 1, 2, . . . , |U1| , (13)
t|U2|∑
i=(t−1)|U2|+1
[Υ]i,(k−1)|U2|+1 =
t|U2|∑
i=(t−1)|U2|+1
[Υ]i,(k−1)|U2|+2
= · · · =
t|U2|∑
i=(t−1)|U2|+1
[Υ]i,k|U2| = [Υ1]t,k , t, k = 1, 2 . . . |U1| ,
(14)
|U1|−1∑
i=0
[Υ]i|U2|+t,k =
|U1|−1∑
i=0
[Υ]i|U2|+t,k+|U2|
= · · · =
|U1|−1∑
i=0
[Υ]i|U2|+t,k+(|U1|−1)|U2| = [Υ2]t,k ,
t, k = 1, 2, . . . |U2| . (15)
Adding these four linear constraints back, the feasible set
specified by (11b)-(11f) can be relaxed, and correspondingly
we obtain the following linear optimization problem which is
a relaxation of (11):
min
Υ1,Υ2
|U1|∑
k=1
[Υ1]k,k +
|U2|∑
k=2
[Υ2]k,k (16a)
s.t. PU1,U2Υ
TPTY |V1,V2 = PU1,U2P
T
Y |V1,V2 , (16b)
0 ≤ [Υ1]i,j ≤ 1, 1 ≤ i ≤ |U1| , 1 ≤ j ≤ |U1| , (16c)
0 ≤ [Υ2]i,j ≤ 1, 1 ≤ i ≤ |U2| , 1 ≤ j ≤ |U2| , (16d)
(12), (13), (14), and (15). (16e)
We note that this linear program can be solved efficiently
using standard linear programming techniques. Comparing the
optimization problems (11) and (16), it is clear that both have
the same objective function. Furthermore, since the feasible
set of (11) is a subset of that of (16), the minimum value of
(16) must be no greater than the minimum value of (11). As
a result, if the minimum value of (16) is |U1|+ |U2|, then the
minimum value of (11) must also be |U1|+|U2|, and hence the
observation channel
(
PU1,U2 , PY |V1,V2
)
is non-manipulable.
Although the converse is not true for the linear program (16),
we may still use it to check for non-manipulability of the
observation channel first before opting to solve the non-convex
problem (11).
V. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES
We give three numerical examples in this section to illustrate
the detectability results of Theorem 1, Propositions 1 and 2.
In all the examples, we assume that the source alphabet is
binary (i.e., |X | = 2) and all the other alphabets are ternary
(i.e., |U1| = |U2| = |V1| = |V2| = 3). For simplicity, we
also assume PY |V1,V2 = I and PU1,U2|X = PU1|X ⊗ PU2|X .
In addition, we note that the decision statistic used in the
proof of Theorem 1 (see Appendix B-A) is too complicated
for practical implementation. Therefore, we employ the simple
heuristic decision statistic
D (Y n) =
∥∥∥ΠY n − PU1,U2PTY |V1,V2 ∥∥∥2 (17)
for Byzantine attack detection in the examples.
A. A Non-manipulable Observation Channel Example for
Demonstrating the Sufficiency in Theorem 1
We first choose the source symbol distribution PX =[
.4999 .5001
]
. Then, we consider a relay network in
which the channels from the source to the two relays are spec-
ified by the PMF matrices PU1|X = PU2|X =
 .9 0.1 .1
0 .9
,
while the channels from the two relays to the destination are
assumed to be perfect, i.e., PY |V1,V2 = I . By solving the linear
program (16), it is easy to check that the observation channel
(PU1,U2 , I) in this example is non-manipulable.
Two different attacks are considered. In the first attack,
referred to as Attack 1, relay 2 performs an i.i.d. attack by
randomly and independently switching its received symbols
according to the conditional distribution specified by PV2|U2 = .995 .0025 .0025.0025 .995 .0025
.0025 .0025 .995
, while relay 1 conducts a non-
i.i.d. attack by randomly and independently switching its ith
input symbol U1,i according to the conditional distribution
PV1|U1 =
 .995 .0025 .0025.0025 .995 .0025
.0025 .0025 .995
 when i is odd, and
according to P˜V1|U1 =
 .95 .025 0.05 .95 .05
0 .025 .95
 when i is even.
Since relay 2 performs an i.i.d. attack, Attack 1 is in the
family (7) according to Proposition 1. By Theorem 1, Attack
1 can be detected in the non-manipulable observation channel
(PU1,U2 , I).
In the second attack considered, referred to as Attack 2,
relay 1 switches its input in the same manner as it does in
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Fig. 3: Empirical CDFs of D (Y n), i.e., Pr(D (Y n) ≤ δ), in
the non-manipulable observation channel example considered
in Section V-A. For n = 103, three different cases are
compared, namely, the “non-malicious” case as well as the
malicious cases of Attack 1 and Attack 2.
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Fig. 4: Empirical CDFs of D (Y n), i.e., Pr(D (Y n) ≤ δ), in
the non-manipulable observation channel example considered
in Section V-A. For n = 105, three different cases are
compared, namely, the “non-malicious” case as well as the
malicious cases of Attack 1 and Attack 2.
Attack 1. Meanwhile, relay 2 conducts the stationary Markov
attack as illustrated in Fig. 2, with PJ1 =
[
6
25 ,
2
5 ,
9
25
]
and PJi+1|Ji =
 13 13 131
4
1
2
1
4
1
6
1
3
1
2
, i = 1, 2 . . . , n. As explained
before (see the description of Fig. 2 in Section III), Proposi-
tion 1 gives that Attack 2 belongs to the family (7). Thus
by Theorem 1, Attack 2 can also be detected in the non-
manipulable observation channel.
We conduct computer simulations to illustrate the de-
tectability of both attacks using the heuristic decision statistic
D (Y n) in (17). The empirical cumulative distribution func-
tions (CDFs) of D (Y n) obtained from the simulation are
plotted in Figs. 3 and 4 for the cases of n = 103 and n = 105,
respectively. From Fig. 4, it is observed that there are clear
separations between the empirical CDFs of D (Y n) for the
non-malicious case and the malicious cases of Attack 1 and
Attack 2 when n = 105. For instance, as seen in Fig. 4,
using the decision threshold δ = 0.01 for D (Y n), one may
differentiate between the non-malicious (both relays faithfully
forward their respective received sequences to the destination)
and malicious cases with negligible miss detection and false
alarm probabilities. This observation verifies sufficiency of
non-manipulability for the detectability of Byzantine attacks
in the family (7) promised by Theorem 1.
B. A Manipulable Observation Channel Example for Demon-
strating the Necessity in Theorem 1
We again consider the same relay network used in the
previous example, except that the source symbol distribu-
tion is now PX =
[
.5 .5
]
and hence giving PU1,U2 = .125 .125 0.125 .25 .125
0 .125 .125
. It is straightforward to check that the
choice of Υ1 = Υ2 =
 −1 0 10 0 0
1 0 −1
 makes this obser-
vation channel (PU1,U2 , I) manipulable. Therefore, according
to Theorem 1, we know that the attacks in the family (7)
are not detectable in this network. In order to verify this, a
simulation is carried out for an i.i.d. attack, referred to as At-
tack 3, where each relay randomly and independently switches
its input symbols according to the conditional distributions
PV1|U1 = PV2|U2 =
 0 0 10 1 0
1 0 0
. Attack 3 corresponds to
the scenario where each relay flips the first and third symbols
in their alphabet. The empirical CDFs of D (Y n) for the “non-
malicious” case and this malicious case obtained from the sim-
ulation are plotted in Fig. 5. It is clearly seen from Fig. 5 that
the CDFs are indistinguishable, regardless of the value of n.
As a result, from D (Y n), we cannot differentiate between the
non-malicious and malicious cases. This observation indicates
that the two properties of Theorem 1 cannot be simultaneously
satisfied in this manipulable observation channel.
C. An Example for Demonstrating Proposition 2
In order to verify the assertion of Proposition 2, we consider
the permutation attack in which each relay permutes the sym-
bols in its input sequences according to vm,i = um,(i+n2 )n
,
where m = 1, 2, and (·)n is the modulo value of its argument
with base n. Simulations are conducted for the permutation
attack in both the non-manipulable observation channel and
the manipulable observation channel considered previously in
Sections V-A and V-B, respectively. The empirical CDFs of
D (Y n) for the non-malicious case and the malicious case
of the permutation attack obtained from the simulations are
plotted in Fig. 6 and Fig. 7 for the non-manipulable and
manipulable observation channels, respectively. We can clearly
see from Figs. 6 and 7 that the CDFs for the malicious and
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Fig. 5: Empirical CDFs of D(Y n), i.e., Pr(Dn ≤ δ), in
the manipulable observation channel example considered in
Section V-B.
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Fig. 6: Empirical CDFs of D (Y n), i.e., Pr(D (Y n) < δ),
for the non-malicious case and the malicious case of the
permutation attack in the non-manipulable observation channel
of Section V-A.
non-malicious cases are indistinguishable, regardless of the
value of n and whether the observation channel is manipulable
or not. In other words, the permutation attack is not detectable.
This is consistent with the assertion of Proposition 2.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We have considered the detectability of Byzantine attacks
conducted by two non-colluding relay nodes in a relay net-
work, where there are two independent paths, each via one
relay node, from the source to the destination. No clean
reference is assumed available to the destination to detect
whether Byzantine attacks have been carried out by the relay
nodes. The destination is allowed to employ only the symbol
sequence that it has received from the relays to perform attack
detection. We have identified a family of attacks that can be
detected with asymptotically small miss detection and false
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Fig. 7: Empirical CDFs of D (Y n), i.e., Pr(D (Y n) ≤ δ)
for the non-malicious case and the malicious case of the
permutation attack in the manipulable observation channel of
Section V-B.
alarm probabilities if and only if the channels that make up
the relay network satisfies a non-manipulability condition. This
family of attacks physically correspond to ones in which the
two relays do not collude in attack. In addition, we have also
shown that there are attacks, which do not belong to this
family, that are not detectable by the destination due to the
lack of a clean reference. These results provide the practical
insight that we should choose relay nodes judiciously in order
to reduce the possibility that they may collude in attack.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1 AND PROPOSITION 2
A. Proof of Proposition 1
In order to prove Proposition 1, we first give the following
lemma.
Lemma 1. Let V˜ n, V n, Un and Wn be jointly distributed
random sequences satisfying:
1) Pr{ΠUn,V n(u, v) > 0} → 1,
2) (V˜ n, V n) and Wn are conditionally independent given
Un, and
3) there exists a constant cw|u such that
E {1i(w|Wn)|Un = un} = cw|u for all ui = u.
Then, we have ΠWn|Un,V n(w|u, v) → ΠWn|Un(w|u) for all
w. Furthermore, if
4) Pr{ΠWn|Un(w|u) > 0} → 1
is also satisfied, then ΠV˜ n|Un,V n,Wn(v˜|u, v,w) →
ΠV˜ n|Un,V n(v˜|u, v) for all v˜.
Proof: Condition 1) guarantees that Pr{ΠUn(u) > 0} →
1. Hence ΠV n|Un(v|u) and ΠV˜ n,V n|Un(v˜, v|u) are well-
defined with high probabilities for all sufficiently large n.
Define
Sn ,
n∑
i=1
{1i(w|Wn)− cw|u}1i(u|Un){1i(v˜, v|V˜ n, V n)
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−ΠV˜ n,V n|Un(v˜, v|u)}. (18)
For any (un, vn, v˜n) conditioned on the event {Un =
un, V n = vn, V˜ n = v˜n}, conditions 2) and 3) guarantee that
the sequence {Sn} is a martingale. According to Hoeffding’s
inequality [20, Theorem 2], we have
Pr
{∣∣∣∣Snn
∣∣∣∣ ≥ µ∣∣∣∣Un = un, V n = vn, V˜ n = v˜n} ≤ 2e−nµ22
(19)
for any µ > 0.
Furthermore, we have the equality
n∑
i=1
1i(u|Un){1i(v˜, v|V˜ n, V n)−ΠV˜ n,V n|Un(v˜, v|u)} = 0,
(20)
which implies that
Sn
n
= ΠV˜ n,V n,Un,Wn(v˜, v, u,w)
−ΠV˜ n,V n|Un(v˜, v|u)ΠUn,Wn(u,w).
The above equation together with (19) gives
Pr
{∣∣ΠV˜ n,V n,Un,Wn(v˜, v, u,w)
−ΠV˜ n,V n|Un(v˜, v|u)ΠUn,Wn(u,w)
∣∣ ≥ µ} ≤ 2e−nµ22 .
(21)
Thus, we have
ΠV˜ n,V n,Un,Wn(v˜, v, u,w)→ΠV˜ n,V n|Un(v˜, v|u)ΠUn,Wn(u,w)
(22)
and
ΠUn,V n,Wn(u, v,w)→ ΠV n|Un(v|u)ΠUn,Wn(u,w)
= ΠUn,V n(u, v)ΠWn|Un(w|u). (23)
Immediately, (23) implies ΠWn|Un,V n(w|u, v) →
ΠWn|Un(w|u). Furthermore, note that if condition 4) holds,
(23) also implies that Pr{ΠUn,V n,Wn(u, v,w) > 0} → 1,
and hence ΠV˜ n|Un,V n,Wn(v˜|u, v,w) is well-defined.
Dividing (22) by (23) gives ΠV˜ n|Un,V n,Wn(v˜|u, v,w) →
ΠV˜ n|Un,V n(v˜|u, v).
Let us now turn our attention to the proof of Proposition 1.
Note that
ΠV n1 ,V n2 |Un1 ,Un2 (v1, v2|u1, u2)
= ΠV n1 |Un1 ,Un2 (v1|u1, u2)ΠV n2 |V n1 ,Un1 ,Un2 (v2|v1, u1, u2). (24)
Since PU1,U2(u1, u2) > 0, we have Pr{ΠUn1 ,Un2 (u1, u2) >
0} → 1. As a result, relying on Lemma 1, we obtain
ΠV n1 |Un1 ,Un2 (v1|u1, u2) → ΠV n1 |Un1 (v1|u1). This result, to-
gether with the assumption Pr{ΠV n1 |Un1 (v1|u1) > 0} →
1, gives Pr{ΠV n1 ,Un1 ,Un2 (v1, u1, u2) > 0} → 1, and thus
ΠV n2 |V n1 ,Un1 ,Un2 (v2|v1, u1, u2) is well-defined. Then, the proof
of Proposition 1 is equivalent to proving
ΠV n2 |V n1 ,Un1 ,Un2 (v2|v1, u1, u2)→ ΠV n2 |Un2 (v2|u2) (25)
as long as the conditions stated in Proposition 1 are satisfied.
To this end, we notice that Proposition 1 essentially assumes
1) (V n1 , U
n
1 ) and V
n
2 are conditionally independent given
Un2 .
2) There exists a constant cv2|u2 such that
E {1i(v2|V n2 )|Un2 = un2} = cv2|u2 for all u2,i = u2.
Substituting these conditions into Lemma 1, it is straightfor-
ward to arrive at (25). Therefore, Proposition 1 is proved.
B. Proof of Proposition 2
The proof of Proposition 2 is presented as follows.
Proof: Let us consider the following two cases:
i) The relays attack their received signals by rearranging
the sequences in the time domain. For any k, t = 1, . . . n,
if V1,k = U1,t and V1,t = U1,k, there must be V2,k =
U2,t and V2,t = U2,k. In such case, we obtain Π ′V nm|Unm 6=
I for m = 1, 2.
ii) Both relays are non-malicious, i.e., ΠV nm|Unm = I for
m = 1, 2.
Let us stack U1 and U2 into a vector denoted as U , i.e.,
U = [U1;U2]. Similarly, we also stack V1 and V2 into
a vector denoted as V , i.e., V = [V1;V2]. The matrices
Un = [Un1 ;U
n
2 ] and V
n = [V n1 ;V
n
2 ], of dimension 2 × n,
represent the input and output random sequences of the relays,
respectively. The ith column in Un and V n is denoted as U i
and V i, respectively. In the case i), from V1,k = U1,t, V1,t =
U1,k and V2,k = U2,t, V2,t = U2,k, we have V k = U t and
V t = Uk, which indicates that V n is actually equivalent
to the rearrangement of Un in the time domain. Since Un
is an i.i.d sequence, the PMF of Un only depends on the
PMFs of its elements. Rearranging Un does not change the
PMFs of its elements, and hence the PMF of Un remains
unchanged. In other words, V n and Un have the same PMF
in the case i). Therefore, the distribution of Y n in both cases
is exactly the same. Thus, any decision statistic D(Y n) also
has the same distribution in both cases. Furthermore, in case
ii), since we have
∑2
m=1 ‖ΠV nm|Unm − I‖2 = 0, Property 2) of
Theorem 1 requires the probability of the event {D (Y n) > δ}
be arbitrarily small as long as δ is sufficiently small and n is
sufficiently large. On the other hand, in the case i), by choosing
δ <
∑2
m=1 ‖Π ′V nm|Unm − I‖2, Property 1) requires that the
probability of the same event {D (Y n) > δ} is arbitrarily
close to 1 as long as n is large enough. Hence, these two
requirements contradict. Therefore, Proposition 2 is proved.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
A. Proof of Sufficiency of Theorem 1
To prove the sufficiency of Theorem 1, we need the follow-
ing Lemma 2 which characterizes the convergence property of
ΠY n . Note that the lemma holds for any arbitrary attack in
the family (7).
Lemma 2. If ΠV n1 ,V n2 |Un1 ,Un2 (v1, v2 |u1, u2 ) →
ΠV n1 |Un1 (v1 |u1 )ΠV n2 |Un2 (v2 |u2 ), we have
∥∥ΠY n −
PU1,U2(Π
T
V n1 |Un1 ⊗ Π
T
V n2 |Un2 )P
T
Y |V1,V2
∥∥
2
→ 0 in probability as
n→∞.
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Proof: According to the definitions of ΠV n1 ,V n2 |Un1 ,Un2 ,
ΠV n1 |Un1 and ΠV n2 |Un2 , the convergence
ΠV n1 ,V n2 |Un1 ,Un2 (v1, v2 |u1, u2 )→ ΠV n1 |Un1 (v1 |u1 )ΠV n2 |Un2 (v2 |u2 )
indicates[
ΠV n1 ,V n2 |Un1 ,Un2
]
i.j
→
[
ΠV n1 ,|Un1
]
t1,k1
[
ΠV n2 ,|Un2
]
t2,k2
,
j = (k1 − 1) |U2|+ k2, i = (t1 − 1) |U2|+ t2.
Then, applying the definition of Kronecker product, we obtain[
ΠV n1 ,V n2 |Un1 ,Un2
]
i.j
→
[
ΠV n1 ,|Un1 ⊗ΠV n2 ,|Un2
]
i,j
, which yields
ΠV n1 ,V n2 |Un1 ,Un2 → ΠV n1 |Un1 ⊗ΠV n2 |Un2 .
For any µ1 > 0, it is clear that (26) holds true, which is
given in the next page. The second probability after the last
“≤” of (26) approaches zero according to the above-obtained
assertion that ΠV n1 ,V n2 |Un1 ,Un2 → ΠV n1 |Un1 ⊗ΠV n2 |Un2 . The first
probability after the last “≤” of (26) also approaches zero,
as shown by the following proof. For ease of description,
we employ the vector notation in the following proof. For
instance, the pair of random variables {U1, U2} is denoted
as U = [U1;U2], whose alphabet U is the Cartesian product
of U1 and U2. For ease of description, we also employ ui to
denote the ith element in U , where i is an integer taking value
from 1 to |U |. Similarly, we also stack V1 and V2 into a vector
denoted as V , i.e., V = [V1;V2], whose alphabet V is the
Cartesian product of V1 and V2. For convenience of exposition,
we employ vi to denote the ith element in V , where i is an
integer taking value from 1 to |V |. Again, Un = [Un1 ;Un2 ] and
V n = [V n1 ;V
n
2 ] denote the input and output random sequences
of the relays, respectively. Correspondingly, un = [un1 ;u
n
2 ]
and vn = [vn1 ; v
n
2 ] denote the generic value of the input and
output sequences of the relays, respectively. In other words,
Un and V n are sequences of random variables, while un and
vn denote the possible value of Un and V n, respectively.
Then, we have
|PUΠTV n|Un PTY |V −ΠY n | =
|Y|∑
i=1
|[PUΠTV n|Un PTY |V ]i − [ΠY n ]i|
≤
|Y|∑
i=1
|U|∑
j=1
|V|∑
k=1
|Hi,j,k|, (27)
where
Hi,j,k = PU (uj)
N (uj , vk |Un,V n )
N (uj |Un ) PY |V (yi |vk )
− N (uj , vk, yi |U
n,V n, Y n )
n
. (28)
This implies that
Pr
{
|PUΠTV n|Un PTY |V −ΠY n | >
µ1
2
}
≤
|Y|∑
i=1
|U |∑
j=1
|V|∑
k=1
Pr
{
|Hi,j,k| ≥ µ1
2 |Y| |U | |V |
}
. (29)
In order to bound Pr
{
‖Hi,j,k‖ ≥ µ12|Y||U ||V|
}
, we first con-
sider to bound
Pr
{
|H˜i,j,k| ≥ µ1
2 |Y| |U | |V |
}
, (30)
where
H˜i,j,k =
N (uj |Un )
n
N (uj , vk |Un,V n )
N (uj |Un ) PY |V (yi |vk )
− N (uj , vk, yi |U
n,V n, Y n )
n
=
N (uj , vk |Un,V n )
n
PY |V (yi |vk )
− N (uj , vk, yi |U
n,V n, Y n )
n
. (31)
For any i, j and k,
Pr
{
|H˜i,j,k| ≥ µ1
2 |Y| |U | |V|
}
≤ 4 |Y|
2 |U |2 |V|2
µ2
E{|H˜i,j,k|2}.
(32)
Furthermore, we have (33), as given on the next page,
where the inequality (b) is obtained based on the fact
that the elements of Y n are conditionally independent
given V n = vn. Again relying on this fact, the inequal-
ity (a) is obtained as follows. Firstly, we have (34), as
given on the next page. Furthermore, for each (un,vn)
and (t, t′) with 1t (uj , vk) 1t′ (uj , vk) = 1, we have (35)
shown on the next page, where the equation (a) is ob-
tained relying on PY |V (yi |vk ) = PY |V,U (yi |vk, uj ). Sub-
stituting (33) into (32), we get Pr{|H˜i,j,k| ≥ µ12|Y||U||V|} →
0 as n → ∞. Comparing H˜i,j,k with Hi,j,k, we see
that H˜i,j,k → Hi,j,k as n → ∞, then we arrive at
Pr
{
|Hi,j,k| ≥ µ12|Y||U||V|
}
→ 0 as n → ∞. Using (29), we
further obtain Pr
{
|PUΠTV n|Un PTY |V −ΠY n | > µ12
}
→ 0 as
n→∞. Thus, this lemma has been proved, because we have
shown that the two probabilities after the last “≤” of (26)
converge to 0 as n approaches infinity.
Applying Lemma 2, the sufficiency proof of Theorem 1
originally outlined in [17] for dealing with i.i.d attacks can
be readily extended to the case of non-i.i.d attacks considered
here. We provide the details of proof below for completeness.
To establish the proof of sufficiency, we construct the
estimators ΠˆV n1 |Un1 and ΠˆV n2 |Un2 from ΠY n according to the
following arrangement:
For µ > 0, let Gµ(ΠY n) be the set of all pairs of the two
stochastic matrices P1 and P2 (their dimensions are |U1|×|U1|
and |U2| × |U2|, respectively), which satisfy∥∥∥PU1,U2(PT1 ⊗ PT2 )PTY |V1,V2 −ΠY n∥∥∥2 ≤ µ; (36)
if Gµ(ΠY n) is non-empty, we set
(ΠˆV n1 |Un1 , ΠˆV n2 |Un2 ) =arg max
(P1,P2)∈Gµ(ΠY n )
2∑
i=1
‖Pi − I‖2; (37)
otherwise, set (ΠˆV n1 |Un1 , ΠˆV n2 |Un2 ) = (I, I). Relying on
(ΠˆV n1 |Un1 , ΠˆV n2 |Un2 ), in what follows we employ the decision
statistic D (Y n) =
∑2
i=1 ‖ΠˆV ni |Uni − I‖2.
1) The Proof of Property 1) of Theorem 1: To show that
this decision statistic satisfies Property 1) of Theorem 1, note
that (38) holds, where the equality in the third line is obtained
relying on ΠˆV n1 |Un1 and ΠˆV n2 |Un2 given by (37), and on the
fact that Pr
{
(ΠV n1 |Un1 , ΠV n2 |Un2 ) ∈ Gµ(ΠY n)
}
as n → ∞,
as implied by Lemma 2. Hence, it is plausible that Property
1) of Theorem 1 is a direct consequence of this latter fact and
(38).
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Pr
{∥∥∥PU1,U2(ΠTV n1 |Un1 ⊗ΠTV n2 |Un2 )PTY |V1,V2 −ΠY n∥∥∥2 > µ1} < Pr{|PU1,U2(ΠTV n1 |Un1 ⊗ΠTV n2 |Un2 )PTY |V1,V2 −ΠY n | > µ1}
≤ Pr
{
|PU1,U2ΠTV n1 ,V n2 |Un1 ,Un2 P
T
Y |V1,V2 −ΠY n | >
µ1
2
}
+
Pr
{
|PU1,U2ΠTV n1 ,V n2 |Un1 ,Un2 P
T
Y |V1,V2 − PU1,U2(ΠTV n1 |Un1 ⊗Π
T
V n2 |Un2 )P
T
Y |V1,V2 | >
µ1
2
}
. (26)
E{|H˜i,j,k|2} = E
{∣∣∣∣N (uj , vk |Un,V n )n PY |V (yi |vk )− N (uj , vk, yi |Un,V n, Y n )n
∣∣∣∣2}
≤ E{
(∑n
t=1
(
PY |V (yi |vk ) 1t (uj , vk)− 1t (uj , vk, yi)
))2}
n2
=
E{(∑nt=1 1t (uj , vk) (PY |V (yi |vk )− 1t (yi)))2}
n2
=
E{
n∑
t,t′=1
1t (uj , vk) 1t′ (uj , vk)
(
PY |V (yi |vk )− 1t (yi)
) (
PY |V (yi |vk )− 1t′ (yi)
)}
n2
≤
E{
n∑
t=1
1t (uj , vk)
(
PY |V (yi |vk )− 1t (yi)
)2}
n2
+
E{
n∑
t,t′=1,t6=t′
1t (uj , vk) 1t′ (uj , vk)
(
PY |V (yi |vk )− 1t (yi)
) (
PY |V (yi |vk )− 1t′ (yi)
)}
n2
(a)
≤
EUn,V n
{
n∑
t=1
E
{
1t (uj , vk)
(
PY |V (yi |vk )− 1t (yi)
)2 |un,vn}}
n2
(b)
≤
n∑
t=1
E
{(
PY |V (yi |vk )− 1t (yi)
)2 |uj , vk}
n2
≤ P
2
Y |V (yi |vk )
n
, (33)
E

n∑
t,t′=1,t 6=t′
1t (uj , vk) 1t′ (uj , vk)
(
PY |V (yi |vk )− 1t (yi)
) (
PY |V (yi |vk )− 1t′ (yi)
)
= EUn,V n

n∑
t,t′=1,t6=t′
E
{
1t (uj , vk) 1t′ (uj , vk)
(
PY |V (yi |vk )− 1t (yi)
) (
PY |V (yi |vk )− 1t′ (yi)
) |un,vn }
 . (34)
E
{
1t (uj , vk) 1t′ (uj , vk)
(
PY |V (yi |vk )− 1t (yi)
) (
PY |V (yi |vk )− 1t′ (yi)
) |un,vn }
= E
{(
PY |V (yi |vk )− 1t (yi)
) (
PY |V (yi |vk )− 1t′ (yi)
) |1t (uj , vk) 1t′ (uj , vk) = 1}
= E
{(
PY |V (yi |vk )− 1t (yi)
) |uj , vk ]E [(PY |V (yi |vk )− 1t′ (yi)) |uj , vk }
(a)
=
(
PY |V (yi |vk )− PY |V (yi |vk )
) (
PY |V (yi |vk )− PY |V (yi |vk )
)
= 0, (35)
2) The Proof of Property 2) of Theorem 1: To prove
Property 2) of Theorem 1, we define the function
F (w) ,
∥∥∥PU1,U2(WT1 ⊗WT2 )PTY |V1,V2 − PU1,U2PTY |V1,V2 ∥∥∥22 ,
where we use Wi, of dimension |Ui| × |Ui|, to denote all
possible values of ΠV ni |Uni for i = 1, 2. Since ΠV ni |Uni is
a stochastic matrix, Wi can be expressed as
Wi =

1−∑|Ui|k=2 [Wi]k,1 · · · · · · [Wi]1,|Ui|
[Wi]2,1
. . . [Wi]2,|Ui|
...
. . .
...
[Wi]|Ui|,1 · · · · · · 1−
∑|Ui|−1
k=1 [Wi]k,|Ui|
,
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Pr
{
D (Y n) > δ
⋂ 2∑
i=1
‖ΠV ni |Uni − I‖2 > δ
}
≥ Pr
{
(ΠV n1 |Un1 , ΠV n2 |Un2 ) ∈ Gµ(ΠY n)
⋂
D (Y n) > δ
⋂ 2∑
i=1
‖ΠV ni |Uni − I‖2 > δ
}
= Pr
{
(ΠV n1 |Un1 , ΠV n2 |Un2 ) ∈ Gµ(ΠY n)
⋂ 2∑
i=1
‖ΠV ni |Uni − I‖2 > δ
}
≥ Pr
{
2∑
i=1
‖ΠV ni |Uni − I‖2 > δ
}
− Pr{(ΠV n1 |Un1 , ΠV n2 |Un2 ) /∈ Gµ(ΠY n)} , (38)
where each entry of Wi takes value from the in-
terval [0, 1]. Then, except the diagonal entries, stack-
ing all entries of both W1 and W2 column by col-
umn, we obtain the vector w. More precisely, w =
[[W1]2,1 , . . . [W1]|U1|,1 , . . . [W1]|U1|−1,|U1| . . . [W2]|U2|−1,|U2|]. It
is straightfoward to check that w and F (w) have the following
properties:
1) All possible w’s belong to D = {w|0 ≤ [Wi]k,j ≤
1,
∑|Ui|
k=1,k 6=j [Wi]k,j ≤ 1, i = 1, 2, k 6= j, k, j =
1, 2, . . . |Ui|
}
. D is a bounded convex and continuous set.
Obviously, it includes w0 , [0, 0, . . . , 0].
2) F (w) is twice continuously differentiable in D.
3) Since the non-manipulable condition is satisfied, w0,
which corresponds to W1 = I and W2 = I , is the unique
solution to F (w) = 0 in D. Moreover, ∇F = 0 at w0.
These properties can be used for proving the following Lemma
3:
Lemma 3. There exists an r1 > 0, depending only on F (w),
such that the closed subset D1 , {w |‖w −w0‖2 ≤ r1 } ∩D
of D has the following property:
For each radial line L emanating from w0 to a point on the
boundary of D1 (i.e., {w |‖w −w0‖2 = r1 } ∩ D), we have
∇LF (w) > 0 for all w 6= w0 on L, where ∇LF is the
orientational derivative of F along L.
Proof: Let us choose an arbitrary orientation from w0,
denoted as L = [l1, l2, . . . , l|w|], ||L||22 = 1. Each point
w along the orientation L can be expressed as w = lL,
where l = ‖w − w0‖2 is positive and continuous-valued.
Then, relying on the orientation L, l could be used to rep-
resent w. We thus rewrite w as wl. Correspondingly, we
define a function f (l) , F (wl) and its derivative function
(i.e.,f ′ (l) , ∇LF (w)) along the orientation L. According
to the third property of F (w), l = 0 is the only solution to
f (l) = 0, and we also have f ′ (0) = 0. To complete the proof,
let us prove that there exists a positive rL such that for any
arbitrary l ∈ (0, rL], we always have f ′ (l) > 0. To this end,
let us discuss two possible cases in the following. In the first
case where f ′ (l) 6= 0 holds true for all l ∈ (0, ∞), there
must exist at least one positive rL that renders f ′ (l) > 0
true for all l ∈ (0, rL]. Otherwise, the contrary statement
that f ′ (l) < 0 for all l ∈ (0, rL] will result in the fact that
f (l) is a decreasing function in the domain (0, rL]. As a
consequence, we will have f (l) < f (0) = 0 for l ∈ (0, rL],
which contradicts the fact that f (0) = 0 is the minimum
value. In addition, if f ′ (l) < 0 holds true for some values
of l and f ′ (l) > 0 for another set of values of l, we can
deduce that there is at least one point making f ′ (l) = 0,
since f ′ (l) is a continuous function according to the second
property that F (w) is twice continuously differentiable. This
in turn contradicts the basic assumption of this case, namely
f ′ (l) 6= 0.
Second, if f ′ (l) can be equal to 0, among all the points
making f ′ (l) = 0, let us choose the one nearest to l = 0,
denoted as s. Then, rL can be chosen from the interval (0, s),
such that for l ∈ (0, rL], we have f ′ (l) 6= 0. Hence, there
must be f ′ (l) > 0 for l ∈ (0, rL]. The explanation is similar
to that of the first case.
Finally, we choose r1 according to r1 =
min
L=
w−w0
||w−w0||2 ,w∈D
rL. Hence, for each radial line L emanating
from w0 to the boundary of D1 = {w |‖w −w0‖2 ≤ r1 }∩D,
we have ∇LF (w) > 0 for all w 6= w0 on L.
Relying on Lemma 3, the function Fmin(r) ,
min
w:‖w−w0‖2=r,w∈D
F (w) is a strictly increasing and bounded
function over 0 ≤ r ≤ r1. Hence, an inverse of Fmin (denoted
by F−1min) exists, which is also increasing and bounded. This
property can be used to prove the following Lemma 4:
Lemma 4. Let us use m to denote min
w∈D−D1
F (w). For all
m′ ∈ (0, m], if w ∈ D and F (w) < m′, then there must exist
‖w −w0‖2 < F−1min(m′). (39)
Proof: Since w0 is not in D − D1 and w0 is the only
point satisfying F (w0) = 0, m is a strictly positive number.
Furthermore, noticing that {w| ‖w −w0‖2 = r1,w ∈ D} is
a part of the boundary of D−D1, we have m 6 Fmin (r1) =
min
w:‖w−w0‖2=r1,w∈D
F (w). Then, for any arbitrary m′ smaller
than m, according to the monotonically increasing property
of F−1min (·), we have F−1min (m′) < F−1min (m) 6 r1. Based
on this observation, we obtain D′ ⊂ D1, where D′ denotes{
w
∣∣‖w −w0‖2 < F−1min (m′)} ∩ D. As a result, D − D′ =
{D − D1}∪
{
D1 −D′
}
holds true, from which the minimum
value of F (w) over D − D′ can be deduced as follows.
Firstly, relying on the monotonically increasing property of
Fmin (·), the minimum value of F (w) over D1 − D′ is m′.
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Secondly, recalling that m is the minimum value of F (w)
over D−D1 and m′ < m, then the minimum value of F (w)
over D − D′ is m′. Therefore, if F (w) < m′ < m, w must
be in D′ = {w ∣∣‖w −w0‖2 < F−1min (m′)}∩D. Otherwise, if
a point wt satisfying F (wt) < m′ were in D − D′, F (wt)
would be less than the minimum value of F (w) over D−D′,
which is a self-contradiction. Lemma 4 has been proved.
Furthermore, since Fmin(r) is continuous at r = 0, the
distance given by the left-hand side of (39) can be made
arbitrarily small by selecting a sufficiently small m′.
Now, let us continue proving Prop-
erty 2) of Theorem 1. First, note that if∥∥∥ΠY n − PU1,U2(ΠTV n1 |Un1 ⊗ΠTV n2 |Un2 )PTY |V1,V2 ∥∥∥2 ≤ µ1, with
the aid of triangular inequality, we obtain (40), as given on
the next page. Based on
∑2
m=1 ‖ΠV nm|Unm − I‖2 ≤ δ, (40)
implies that
‖PU1,U2(ΠˆTV n1 |Un1 ⊗ Πˆ
T
V n2 |Un2 )P
T
Y |V1,V2 − PU1,U2PTY |V1,V2 ‖2
≤ µ+ µ1 + δ2 |U1|3 |U2|3 . (41)
The bound on the right-hand side of (41) can be made smaller
than m of Lemma 4, provided that δ, µ1 and µ are all
sufficiently small. Thus, applying Lemma 4, we arrive at
D(Y n) ≤ (|U1|2 + |U2|2) · F−1min (µ+ µ1 + δ2 |U1|3 |U2|3) .
(42)
Finally, setting both µ1 and µ to δ, (42) proves Property 2) of
Theorem 1, where we have
ε(δ) ,
(|U1|2 + |U2|2)F−1min (2δ + δ2 |U1|3 |U2|3) ,
which vanishes as δ decreases to 0.
B. Proof of Necessity of Theorem 1
We assume that the observation channel is manipulable, i.e.,
there exist Υ1 and Υ2 satisfying
1)
2∑
m=1
‖Υm − I‖22 > 0,
2) For an arbitrary value of m ∈ {1, 2}, Υm is a stochastic
matrix, and
3) PU1,U2
(
2⊗
m=1
Υm
)T
PTY |V1,V2 = PU1,U2P
T
Y |V1,V2 .
Now, let us consider the following two cases:
i) The relay m modifies its input symbols according to
PVm|Um = Υm, where m = 1, 2, in an i.i.d manner.
In order to avoid confusion, we use Π ′V nm|Unm to repre-
sent the value of ΠV nm|Unm obtained in such case, i.e.,
ΠV nm|Unm = Π
′
V nm|Unm . Due to the i.i.d attack, we get
Π ′V nm|Unm → PVm|Um for m = 1, 2 according to the law
of large numbers. Recall that PVm|Um = Υm, we get∑2
m=1 ‖Π ′V nm|Unm − I‖2 > 0 and
PU1,U2
(
2⊗
m=1
PVm|Um
)T
PTY |V1,V2 = PU1,U2P
T
Y |V1,V2 .
(43)
ii) Neither of the relays is malicious, i.e., ΠV nm|Unm = I for
m = 1, 2.
In both cases, Y n is an i.i.d sequence, whose distribution only
depends on the distribution of Y . In the case i), the distribution
of Y is PU1,U2
(
2⊗
m=1
PVm|Um
)T
PTY |V1,V2 . In the case ii), the
distribution of Y is PU1,U2P
T
Y |V1,V2 . From (43), we can see
that the distributions of Y n in both cases are exactly the same.
Thus, any decision statistic D(Y n) has the same (conditional)
distribution in the above-mentioned two cases. Nevertheless,
in the case ii), since
∑2
m=1 ‖ΠV nm|Unm − I‖2 = 0, Property
2) of Theorem 1 requires that the probability of the event
{D (Y n) > δ} is arbitrarily small as long as δ is sufficiently
small and n is sufficiently large. On the other hand, in the case
i), by choosing δ that satisfies δ <
∑2
m=1 ‖Π ′V nm|Unm − I‖2,
Property 1) of Theorem 1 requires that the probability of the
same event {D (Y n) > δ} is arbitrarily close to 1 as long
as n is large enough. Hence, these two requirements lead to
contradiction. Therefore, the necessity of Theorem 1 has been
proved.
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